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Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
Under the AEDPA: The National Council Court 
Erred in Requiring Pre-Designation Process 
I. INTRODUCTION 
September 11 will forever evoke terrible memories of the death 
and destruction caused by coordinated terrorist attacks against the 
United States.1 Following the attacks, President Bush announced 
that “[t]here has been an act of war declared upon America by 
terrorists,”2 and we will respond by “direct[ing] every resource at 
our command, every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, 
every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and 
every necessary weapon of war, to the disruption and to the defeat of 
the global terror network.”3 An important weapon in this “war” 
against terrorism is the ability of the Secretary of State, under the 
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA” or 
“Act”), to block all financial transactions involving the assets of 
foreign terrorist organizations in the United States, to prevent 
people from providing material support to foreign terrorist 
organizations, and to prohibit representatives of foreign terrorist 
organizations from entering the United States.4 
Designation of an entity under the AEDPA as a foreign terrorist 
organization represents one of those “‘extraordinary situations’ that  
 
 
 1. These attacks have been linked to Osama bin Laden, who is the leader of a terrorist 
organization known as al-Qa’ida. See Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the 
United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 1347 (Sept. 20, 2001). 
 2. Remarks in a Meeting with the National Security Team and an Exchange with 
Reporters at Camp David, Maryland, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1319, 1320 (Sept. 15, 
2001). 
 3. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to 
the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1347, 1349 (Sept. 20, 
2001). 
 4. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189 (West 2001), amended by Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA 
Patriot) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
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justify postponing notice and opportunity for a hearing.”5 If an 
organization received prior notice that it was being considered as a 
foreign terrorist organization, it would have an opportunity to 
immediately transfer all of its financial assets outside the jurisdiction 
of the United States, frustrating the intent of Congress and the 
foreign policy goals of the President.6 The United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia recently rejected this reasoning 
in National Council of Resistance of Iran v. Department of State 
(“National Council”) and held that the Secretary of State 
(“Secretary”) must afford putative terrorist organizations with due 
process prior to their designation under the AEDPA.7 The court also 
held that the Secretary must provide these organizations with notice 
of the basis of a designation and the opportunity to introduce 
rebuttal evidence into the record. A careful review of the AEDPA, 
current due process jurisprudence, and the facts of National Council 
will indicate that the court was incorrect in requiring pre-designation 
process. 
Part II of this Note discusses the designation provisions of the 
AEDPA. Part III reviews current procedural due process 
jurisprudence. Part IV discusses the case law with respect to due 
process challenges of the designation provisions of the AEDPA. Part 
V is divided into two primary sections, one discussing the timing of 
due process and the other discussing the content of due process in 
light of the AEDPA and the facts of National Council. This Note 
concludes in Part VI that the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia should reevaluate its holding in National 
Council and find that providing post-designation process to putative 
terrorist organizations with financial assets in the United States does 
not violate the Due Process Clause. 
 
 5. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 
U.S. 371, 379 (1971)). 
 6. Brief for Respondents at 48, Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 
251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439). 
 7. Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 
2001). See also Jason Binimow & Amy Bunk, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and 
Operation of “Foreign Terrorist Organization” Provision of Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act (AEDPA), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189, 2001 A.L.R. FED. 9 (2001); Robyn Whipple Diaz, 
Foreign Organizations Designated as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” Are Entitled to Due 
Process Protection when such a Designation Is Made by the Secretary of State, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 268 (2001); D.C. Circuit Considers Due Process Issues in Context of “Foreign Terrorist 
Organization” Designations, 78 NO. 31 INTER. REL. 1304 (2001). 
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II. DESIGNATION OF FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 
UNDER THE AEDPA 
A. The Procedural Requirements of Designation 
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
authorizes the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary 
of the Treasury and Attorney General,8 “to designate an organization 
as a foreign terrorist organization”9 upon finding that the 
organization meets certain statutorily defined criteria.10 The 
Secretary is required to compile an administrative record, which may 
include classified information,11 and base his findings upon the 
information gathered therein.12 Any classified information contained 
in the record need not be disclosed to a designated organization, but 
the “information may be disclosed to a court ex parte and in camera 
for purposes of judicial review.”13 A designation made under the 
statute is effective for a period of two years, and the Secretary may 
redesignate the organization for another two-year period upon 
finding that the relevant circumstances on which the previous 
designation was based still exist.14 
Seven days prior to making a designation, the Secretary must 
notify various congressional leaders of his intent to designate an 
organization and of the factual basis for the designation.15 Seven days 
after such notification, the Secretary must publish the designation in 
the Federal Register.16 Once the Secretary notifies Congress of the 
impending designation, all financial transactions involving the assets 
of the organization in the United States may be blocked.17 All 
 
 8. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(c)(4). 
 9. Id. § 1189(a)(1). 
 10. See id. The statutorily defined criteria will be discussed in detail in the following 
section. In brief, the Secretary must find that the organization is foreign, that it engages in 
terrorism, and that its activities threaten the national security of the United States. 
 11. See id. § 1189(a)(3)(B). 
 12. See id. § 1189(a)(3); Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 196 (citing 5 U.S.C.A. § 557(c) 
(West 2001)). 
 13. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(3)(B); Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 197. 
 14. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(4)(A)–(B). 
 15. See id. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(i). 
 16. See id. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
 17. The statute authorizes the blockage of “any assets” within the possession or control 
of a United States financial institution. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(2)(C). Other statutory 
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persons within or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States 
who “knowingly provide[] material support” to the organization, or 
attempt or conspire to do so, are subject to fines and 
imprisonment.18 All financial institutions that do not maintain 
control over and report to the Secretary the existence of any foreign 
terrorist organization funds are also subject to severe fines.19 In 
addition, alien representatives and members of the designated 
foreign terrorist organization are ineligible for visas or admission into 
the United States.20 
B. The Definition of a Foreign Terrorist Organization 
As mentioned above, the AEDPA authorizes the Secretary to 
designate an organization as a foreign terrorist organization; 
however, before making a designation, the Secretary must find that 
an organization meets three statutorily defined criteria: (1) the 
organization must be a “foreign” organization;21 (2) the 
organization must “engage[] in terrorist activity”;22 and (3) the 
organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must “threaten[] the 
security of United States nationals or the national security of the 
United States.”23 Each of these criteria will be discussed in detail 
below. 
1. The organization must be a “foreign” organization 
The Secretary must first make a finding, based on substantial 
evidence in the record,24 that the organization is a “foreign” 
organization.25 Unfortunately, the statute does not define the term 
 
language contemplates that these financial assets will probably consist of “funds.” See 18 
U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(2) (West 2001). 
 18. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(1), amended by Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act 
of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
 19. See id. § 2339B(b). 
 20. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)–(V) (West 2001), amended by Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
 21. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(1)(A). 
 22. Id. § 1189(a)(1)(B). 
 23. Id. § 1189(a)(1)(C). 
 24. People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 23–24 (D.C. Cir. 
1999). 
 25. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(1)(A). 
ELL-FIN 9/30/2002 9:20 AM 
675] Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
 679 
“foreign organization.” Indeed, nowhere in the United States Code 
is the term “foreign organization” defined.26 While such an inquiry 
may seem trivial, it is a legitimate ground on which an organization 
designated under the AEDPA may challenge the designation. 
Despite the lack of statutory guidance, there is some evidence 
that the Secretary will narrowly interpret the term “foreign 
organization” when making designations under the AEDPA. On 
October 8, 1999, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright redesignated 
the Mujahedin-e Khalq (“PMOI”) as a foreign terrorist 
organization.27 The Secretary also redesignated a number of other 
organizations as aliases of PMOI and included them within the scope 
of PMOI’s designation.28 One organization so designated for the 
first time was the National Council of Resistance of Iran (“NCRI”). 
NCRI, the U.S. representative office of NCRI (“NCRIUS”), and 
PMOI challenged the designation in National Council.29 In its 
petition for review, NCRIUS argued that since it was a domestic 
non-profit corporation organized under the laws of the District of 
Columbia, it was not a “foreign organization” and thus could not be 
designated as such under the AEDPA. 30 In a terse response, the 
government agreed that NCRIUS was not included in the 
designation.31 This small exchange is perhaps a hint that the 
 
 26. The term is defined in a few unrelated sections of the Code of Federal Regulations. 
For example, in 12 C.F.R. § 347.102(k) (2001), the term “foreign organization” is defined as 
“an organization that is organized under the laws of a foreign country.” 
 27. See Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,112 (Oct. 8, 
1999). 
 28. In the designation, the Secretary named “Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization,” and 
then listed its aliases:  
also known as MEK, also known as MKO, also known as Mujahedin-e Khalq, also 
known as People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran, also known as PMOI, also 
known as Organization of the People’s Holy Warriors of Iran, also known as 
Sazeman-e Mujahedin-e Khalq-e Iran, also known as National Council of 
Resistance, also known as NCR, also known as the National Liberation Army of 
Iran, also known as NLA. 
Id. 
 29. 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001). This case will be examined below. 
 30. See Brief for Petitioners National Council of Resistance of Iran and National Council 
of Resistance of Iran, U.S. Representative Office at 16, Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d 192 (Nos. 99-
1438, 99-1439). The court in National Council also noted that “[a] third petitioner, National 
Council of Resistance of Iran-United States (“NCRI-US”) joined the brief of NCRI, fearful 
that because the Secretary did not distinguish between the NCRI and NCRI-US it may have 
been included in the designation as well.” Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 197 n.1. 
 31. Brief for Respondents at 28, Nat’l Council (Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439). The court in 
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government will not include an organization, corporation, or 
association organized under the laws of the United States within its 
definition of a “foreign organization” for purposes of the AEDPA, 
even if such an organization, corporation, or association is 
substantially controlled, owned, dominated, or sponsored by a 
foreign organization or government. In light of the recent terrorist 
attacks against the United States, the government may become more 
willing to include a domestic organization within a designation if the 
organization is sponsored or controlled by a foreign terrorist 
organization; however, recent designations indicate a continued 
policy of interpreting “foreign organization” narrowly.32 
It is important to note here that a “foreign” entity must also be 
deemed an “organization.”33 It appears, however, that Congress did 
not mean for the definition of “organization” to restrict the 
Secretary’s ability to designate an entity under the AEDPA. Indeed, 
Congress defined a “terrorist organization” as an organization so 
designated under the AEDPA; an organization that engages in 
terrorist activities otherwise designated by the Secretary as a terrorist 
organization; or “a group of two or more individuals, whether 
organized or not, which engages in [terrorist] activities.”34 Under 
this definition, it is difficult to imagine a situation where an entity or 
group would not fit within the definition of “organization” for 
purposes of the AEDPA. 
2. The foreign organization must engage in “terrorism” or “terrorist 
activity” 
Once the Secretary finds that an organization is “foreign,” she 
must find, based on substantial support in the record35 that the 
 
National Council noted that “[i]n its brief to this court, the United States agrees that NCRI-
US was not so designated, and we therefore do not separately consider any claims on behalf of 
that entity.” See Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 197 n.1. 
 32. In recent designations, the Secretary renewed PMOI’s designation and NCRI’s 
designation as an alias of PMOI, but the Secretary did not specifically include NCRIUS in its 
designation. See Redesignation of Foreign Terrorist Organization, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,088 (Oct. 
5, 2001). 
 33. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(1)(A) (West 2001). 
 34. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi), amended by Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act 
of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
 35. People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 23–24 (D.C. Cir. 
1999). Essentially, the Secretary must have enough information in the record to support a 
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foreign organization “engages in terrorist36 activity.”37 The statutory 
definition of terrorist activity is broad and includes unlawful activity 
which involves the “highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance,” 
hostage taking, an attack or assassination, or the use of weapons or 
dangerous devices with the requisite intent,38 including biological, 
chemical, and nuclear weapons.39 Furthermore, the definition of 
terrorist activity includes any threat, attempt, or conspiracy to engage 
in any of the activities listed above.40 
An organization engages in terrorist activity when it commits or 
incites another to commit a terrorist activity, when it prepares or 
plans a terrorist activity, when it “gather[s] information on potential 
targets for terrorist activity,” when it solicits funds for a terrorist 
activity or another terrorist organization, or when it solicits an 
individual to engage in terrorist activity or to become a member of a 
terrorist organization.41 In addition, an organization engages in 
terrorist activity when it provides material support “for the 
commission of a terrorist activity, or to a terrorist organization.”42 
 
reasonable belief that the foreign organization is engaged in terrorist activities. Id. at 25; 
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 36. The term terrorism is defined as “premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” 22 
U.S.C.A. § 2656f(d)(2) (West 2001). 
 37. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(1)(B). 
 38. The statute defines the requisite intent as the “intent to endanger, directly or 
indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to cause substantial damages to property.” 
Id. § 1182(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b). 
 39. Id. § 1182(3)(B)(iii)(I)–(V). 
 40. Id. § 1182(3)(B)(iii)(VI). 
 41. Id. § 1182(3)(B)(iv)(I)–(V). 
 42. Id. § 1182(3)(B)(iv)(VI). The statute defines “material support or resources” as 
“currency or other financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or 
assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, 
facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical 
assets, except medicine or religious materials.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339A(b) (West 2001), 
amended by Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 
272 (2001). The Ninth Circuit in Humanitarian Law Project affirmed the district court’s 
finding that “two of the components included within the definition of material support, 
‘training’ and ‘personnel,’ were impermissibly vague,” and “enjoined the prosecution of . . . 
[people] for activities covered by these terms.” Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 
1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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3. The terrorist activities of a foreign organization must threaten 
national security 
The third and final finding required under the AEDPA before 
designation is that “the terrorist activity or terrorism of the 
organization threatens the security of United States nationals or the 
national security of the United States.”43 The statute defines 
“national security” as “the national defense, foreign relations, or 
economic interests of the United States.”44 The finding can be based 
not only on domestic national security threats but also on threats to 
U.S. nationals or U.S. interests abroad.45 
C. Judicial Review of Designations 
An organization may challenge a designation made under the 
AEDPA in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia within thirty days after publication of the designation in 
the Federal Register.46 The Act provides for judicial review “based 
solely upon the administrative record.”47 As noted previously, the 
Secretary may also submit to the court classified information for ex 
parte and in camera review.48 There is no opportunity for a 
designated foreign terrorist organization to introduce rebuttal 
evidence into the record.49 Judicial examination of a designation is 
limited to the first two findings required by the Act, i.e., that the 
“organizations are ‘foreign’ and that they ‘engage[] in terrorist 
 
 43. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(1)(C) (West 2001). 
 44. Id. § 1189(c)(2). 
 45. The designation of PMOI is a good example of an organization that arguably did 
not threaten domestic interests but did threaten U.S. interests abroad. The Secretary 
designated PMOI as a foreign terrorist organization in 1997. See Designation of Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,650 (Oct. 8, 1997). At that time, PMOI had “no 
presence in the United States,” People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Department of State, 182 
F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999), but it did threaten U.S. interests in Iran. PMOI “collaborated 
with Ayatollah Khomeini to overthrow the former Shah of Iran. As part of that struggle, they 
assassinated at least six American citizens, supported the takeover of the U.S. embassy, and 
opposed the release of American hostages.” Id. at 20 (internal quotations omitted). PMOI also 
“exploded time bombs at more than a dozen sites throughout Tehran, including the Iran-
American Society, . . . and the offices of Pepsi Cola and General Motors.” Id. (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 46. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(b)(1). 
 47. Id. § 1189(b)(2). 
 48. Id. 
 49. See People’s Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 25. 
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activity.’”50 The Secretary’s determination that the organization 
threatens national security is not subject to judicial review because it 
implicates foreign policy and national security issues.51 Upon review, 
the court may set aside a designation it finds to be: (1) “arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law”; (2) “contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or 
immunity”; (3) “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or 
limitation, or short of statutory right”; (4) “lacking substantial 
support in the administrative record taken as a whole or in classified 
information submitted to the court . . . ”; or (5) “not in accord with 
the procedures required by law.”52 
III. THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF  
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
Before examining relevant case law with regard to the 
designation provisions of the AEDPA, this section will review current 
due process jurisprudence generally. This foundation will be helpful 
in understanding the reasoning underlying the People’s Mojahedin 
and National Council decisions discussed in Part IV below. This 
foundation will also be useful in Part V of this Note, where current 
due process jurisprudence will be applied to the designation 
provisions of the AEDPA generally, and the facts of the National 
Council decision specifically, in order to analyze the strengths and 
weaknesses of that decision. 
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that 
“[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”53 Courts have interpreted this clause to 
 
 50. Id. at 24. The court had previously held that 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(1)(C) was not 
subject to judicial review. Id. at 23. 
 51. Id. at 22. 
 52. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(b)(3). 
 53. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The amendment provides in full that: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land 
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
Id. The source of this concept is often traced to the original Charter of 1215 which provided 
that “[n]o free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any 
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have a procedural and a substantive component.54 Substantive due 
process concerns whether government action depriving an individual 
of life, liberty, or property bears “a rational relation to a 
constitutionally permissible objective.”55 On the other hand, 
procedural due process, which is the focus of this Note, “provides 
that certain substantive rights—life, liberty, and property—cannot be 
deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures.”56 
While the procedural protections required by the Due Process Clause 
do not have “a fixed content unrelated to time, place and 
circumstances,”57 the Supreme Court has held that “[t]he 
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be 
heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”58 A court 
must examine three critical issues in any procedural due process 
claim asserted by a foreign person or entity: (1) whether the person 
or entity has a constitutional presence in the United States; (2) 
whether government action deprived the person or entity of a 
constitutionally protected interest; and (3) whether the procedural 
protections provided by the government, if any, were constitutionally 
sufficient.59 
A. The Foreign Person or Entity Must Have a  
Constitutional Presence in the United States 
The first issue a court must address when examining a due 
process claim asserted by a foreign person or entity is whether the 
 
way ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or 
by the law of the land.” CHARLES A. MILLER, THE FOREST OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW: THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 3, 4 (1977) (emphasis added). In the 1354 reissue 
of the Charter, the Magna Carta appeared officially in English for the first time, and in place of 
the words “by the law of the land,” are the words “by due process of the law.” Id. at 5. 
 54. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.1 
(6th ed. 2000). 
 55. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 733 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing 
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955)). 
 56. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). See also RONALD 
D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 2 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND 
PROCEDURE § 14.6 (2d ed. 1992), for a discussion of the differences between procedural due 
process and substantive due process. 
 57. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. 
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961)). 
 58. Id. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
 59. See generally ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 56, at § 17.1. 
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person or entity has a constitutional presence in the United States.60 
A foreign person or entity “without property or presence in this 
country has no constitutional rights, under the due process clause or 
otherwise.”61 The Supreme Court has held that “aliens receive 
constitutional protections when they have come within the territory 
of the United States and developed substantial connections with this 
country.”62 This standard has been interpreted to apply to foreign 
organizations as well.63 What exactly constitutes “substantial 
connections” in any given factual context is not clear, but an 
organization’s interest in a financial account held in the United 
States is generally sufficient to establish such connections.64 In any 
event, the constitutional presence of a foreign person or organization 
is an important factor in any due process analysis because it may be 
that the organization is not entitled to constitutional protection at 
all, much less entitled to specific protection under the Due Process 
Clause. 
B. There Must Be a Deprivation of Life, Liberty, or Property 
The second issue a court must address when examining a due 
process claim is whether some type of government action has 
deprived a person or entity of a life, liberty, or property interest 
within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.65 It is well 
recognized that “the range of interests protected by procedural due 
process is not infinite”66 but is limited to a literal and restrictive 
definition of life, liberty, and property.67 If a life, liberty, or property 
interest is not implicated, the government is free to deprive an 
 
 60. See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 
1999). 
 61. See, e.g., id. at 22. 
 62. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990). 
 63. See, e.g., Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. 
Cir 2001); People’s Mojahedin, 182 F.3d 17. 
 64. See, e.g., Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d 192 (2001). In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 
564, 571–72 (1972), the Supreme Court noted that it was clear “that the property interests 
protected by procedural due process extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, 
chattels, or money.” If a property interest in “real estate, chattels, or money” is protected by 
due process, it seems logical that its ownership by a foreign organization would establish that 
organization’s constitutional presence. 
 65. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Roth, 408 U.S. at 569–72. 
 66. Roth, 408 U.S. at 570. 
 67. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 56, § 17.2. 
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individual of an interest without adhering to the procedural 
requirements of the Due Process Clause.68 Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has “repeatedly rejected the notion that any grievous loss 
visited upon a person by the State is sufficient to invoke the 
procedural protection of the Due Process Clause.”69 
The first protected interest mentioned in the Due Process Clause 
is “life.” The Supreme Court has never defined the term “life,” but 
some of the Court’s decisions regarding the prohibition of voluntary 
abortions imply that for purposes of due process, life begins 
postnatally.70 Also implicit in the Court’s death penalty cases is the 
notion that life is the period of time, from birth until death, in which 
a person exists as an animate being.71 Under these definitions, it 
appears that the designation provisions of the AEDPA, limited as 
they are to foreign “organizations,” do not implicate an individual’s 
interest in “life.” 
The second interest protected by the Due Process Clause is 
“liberty.” This interest is generally defined as the right “to enjoy 
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the 
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”72 The term “liberty” 
undoubtedly encompasses “freedom from bodily restraint,”73 but it 
also includes freedom from government deprivation of certain 
fundamental rights.74 These fundamental rights are those that have 
“specific textual recognition [in the Constitution] of their existence 
and importance,”75 those that are “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if they 
were sacrificed,”76 and those that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
 
 68. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977). Of course, the government’s 
action may still implicate other constitutional provisions. 
 69. Id. (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976)). 
 70. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 56, § 17.3. The Court in Roe v. Wade held 
that “the word ‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.” 
410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). In nearly all the instances where the word “person” is used in the 
Constitution, “it has application only postnatally. None indicates, with any assurance, that it 
has any possible prenatal application.” Id. at 157. 
 71. See generally Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 
(1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 72. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). 
 75. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 790 
(1986) (White, J., dissenting). 
 76. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26 (1937). 
ELL-FIN 9/30/2002 9:20 AM 
675] Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
 687 
history and tradition.”77 The Supreme Court has considered most of 
the guarantees provided by the Bill of Rights as “fundamental,” and 
thus protected under the Due Process Clause.78 Although not in the 
context of a due process claim, the consequences of designation have 
been challenged as violating certain constitutional interests that may 
qualify as liberty interests. However, the issue of whether the 
designation provisions under the AEDPA deprive a person or 
organization of a constitutionally protected liberty interest has yet to 
be directly addressed. 
The third and final interest protected by the Due Process Clause 
is “property.” The Due Process Clause protects all traditional forms 
of personal and real property, including money,79 and the Supreme 
Court has extended this protection to “entitlements.”80 The Court 
noted that “[t]o have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly 
must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have 
more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a 
legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”81 Entitlements are not defined 
by the Constitution; “they are created and their dimensions are 
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an 
independent source such as state law—rules or understandings that 
secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to 
those benefits.”82 Thus, a governmentally conferred benefit becomes 
a constitutionally protected property interest when the “law which 
governs the dispensation of the benefit . . . define[s] the interest in  
 
 
 
 77. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). 
 78. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 56, § 17.4, and accompanying citations. 
Fundamental rights are by no means limited to those identified in the Bill of Rights. In Board 
of Regents v. Roth, the Court noted that the term “liberty” denotes the following: 
[T]he right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common 
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and 
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, 
and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the 
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 
408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)). 
 79. In Roth, 408 U.S. at 571–72, the Supreme Court noted that it was clear “that the 
property interests protected by procedural due process extend well beyond actual ownership of 
real estate, chattels, or money.” 
 80. Id. at 577. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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such a way that the individual should continue to receive it under the 
terms of the law.”83 
It is fairly well established that a person’s property interest in 
money or a bank account in the United States is sufficient to 
establish the possessor’s constitutional presence.84 The deprivation of 
this interest will entitle the possessor to the protection of the Due 
Process Clause. This is probably the most obvious constitutionally 
protected interest implicated by the designation of an entity as a 
foreign terrorist organization under the AEDPA. Even a cursory 
glance at the designation provisions of the AEDPA indicates that one 
of the primary goals of the Act is to block all financial transactions 
involving the funds of a putative foreign terrorist organization.85 
Indeed, the deprivation of this interest was the basis upon which the 
National Council court held that the putative foreign terrorist 
organizations in that case were entitled to due process. 
C. The Procedure, If Any, Must Be Constitutionally Sufficient 
The second critical issue a court must examine when confronted 
with a due process claim is whether the procedural protection 
provided by the government, if any, is constitutionally sufficient. 
Due process “is a flexible concept that varies with the particular 
situation.”86 Three factors identify “the specific dictates of due 
process.”87 First, a court must consider “the private interest that will 
be affected by the official action.”88 Second, a court must inquire 
into “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards.”89 The third and final factor 
embodies a consideration of “the Government’s interest, including  
 
 
 83. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 56, § 17.5. 
 84. See, e.g., Roth, 408 U.S. at 571–72; Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 
U.S. 437, 444–45, 448 (1952). In North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., the Court 
held that “a bank account surely [is] a form of property,” and its impoundment without notice 
or hearing violates due process. 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975). 
 85. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(2)(C) (West 2001); 18 U.S.C.A § 2339B(a)(2)(A) (West 
2001). 
 86. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). 
 87. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that 
the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”90 
Applying this so-called Mathews balancing test, the Court usually 
finds that due process demands “that a deprivation of life, liberty, or 
property ‘be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing 
appropriate to the nature of the case.’”91 The purpose of this general 
rule “is not only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual,” but to 
ensure that the individual is protected from “arbitrary 
encroachment[s]” of the government, and “to minimize 
substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations.”92 There are exceptions 
to this general rule in “extraordinary situations where some valid 
governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing 
until after the event,”93 or when it is impossible for the government 
to provide pre-deprivation process for the particular deprivation at 
issue.94 
The Mathews balancing test should be used in at least two 
distinct areas of procedural due process analysis.95 First, the test 
should be used when determining whether an individual is entitled 
to a hearing prior to a government deprivation of a protected 
interest.96 This is sometimes called the “when” of due process.97 
Second, regardless of when notice and a hearing are required, the 
test should be used “to determine the precise procedures to be 
employed at the hearing.”98 This is sometimes called the “what” of 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)). See, e.g., 
id. at 542 (concluding that the “root requirement of the Due Process Clause [is] that an 
individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant 
property interest”). 
 92. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80–81 (1972). 
 93. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971). 
 94. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 129 (1990). In circumstances where it would 
be impossible for a state to provide notice and a hearing prior to the deprivation, the Court has 
held that a state common law tort remedy is sufficient procedure under the Due Process 
Clause. Id. 
 95. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 56, § 17.8. 
 96. See id.; see also Zinermon, 494 U.S. 113; Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing 
Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); Hodel v. Virginia, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
 97. Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 205–06 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001). 
 98. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 56, § 17.8; see, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319 (1976). 
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due process.99 For purposes of analytical clarity, this Note will 
maintain the distinction between the “when” of due process and the 
“what” of due process in the sections below. 
IV. THE PEOPLE’S MOJAHEDIN AND  
NATIONAL COUNCIL DECISIONS 
There are two significant cases involving due process challenges 
of designation made under the AEDPA: People’s Mojahedin and 
National Council.100 In People’s Mojahedin, the D.C. Circuit held 
that a foreign organization with no property or presence in the 
United States is not entitled to any due process protection under the 
Act.101 The court did not address the question of whether 
constitutional protection should be afforded to an organization with 
property or presence in the United States. Two years later in 
National Council, in response to another due process claim, the 
D.C. Circuit held that a foreign organization with property in the 
United States is entitled to notice and to some type of hearing prior 
to designation under the AEDPA.102 The facts and analyses of both 
cases are briefly examined in the following subsections. 
A. The People’s Mojahedin Decision 
The D.C. Circuit held in People’s Mojahedin that the 
Constitution does not protect a foreign organization without 
property or presence in the United States.103 The plaintiffs in that 
case were the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“LTTE”) and the 
People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (“PMOI”). Both 
organizations were designated as “foreign terrorist organizations” by  
 
 
 99. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 205–06. 
 100. See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17 (1999); Nat’l 
Council, 251 F.3d 192 (2001); see also 32 County Sovereignty Committee v. Dep’t of State, 
292 F.3d 797 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (following the analysis in People’s Mojahdin). The statute has 
been challenged on other grounds. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 
1133 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the AEDPA did not violate the First Amendment, but 
enjoining the prosecution of plaintiffs for activities covered by the impermissibly vague words 
“training” and “material”). 
 101. See People’s Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 22. 
 102. See Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 208–09. 
 103. See People’s Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 22. 
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the Secretary of State on October 8, 1997,104 and both organizations 
subsequently sought judicial review of the designations under 8 
U.S.C.A. § 1189(b)(1).105 The organizations argued that their due 
process rights were violated because “the Secretary’s designation had 
the effect of making it a crime to donate money to them.”106 The 
D.C. Circuit quickly disposed of this argument, holding that because 
the LTTE and the PMOI had no property or presence in the United 
States, they had “no constitutional rights, under the due process 
clause or otherwise.”107 
Despite this holding, the LTTE and the PMOI were still entitled 
to exercise the statutory rights conferred upon them by the AEDPA. 
These rights consisted of contesting “their designations on the 
grounds set forth in § 1189(b)(3),” which entailed seeking the 
court’s “judgment about whether the Secretary followed statutory 
procedures, or whether she made the requisite findings, or whether 
the record she assembled substantially supports her findings.”108 
After reviewing the record under these standards, the court 
concluded that none of the organizations’ statutory rights were 
violated and refused to set aside the designations.109 
In reaching its decision, the court noted that it could set aside a 
designation under the AEDPA if the first two requisite findings, i.e., 
that an organization is foreign and that it engages in terrorist 
activities, did not have substantial support in the administrative 
record.110 However, the court held that the third and final required 
finding—that the terrorist activity of the organization threaten 
national security—is non-justiciable because it is a decision “of a kind 
for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor 
responsibility and [has] long been held to belong in the domain of 
political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.”111 
 
 104. See Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,650 (Oct. 8, 
1997). 
 105. See People’s Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 18–19. 
 106. Id. at 22. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See id. at 25. 
 110. See id. at 22, 24. 
 111. Id. at 23 (quoting Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steam Ship Corp., 333 
U.S. 103, 111 (1948)). The position of the D.C. Circuit as to the third factor is consistent 
with a long line of Supreme Court decisions finding executive and legislative decisions 
involving national security and foreign relations issues non-justiciable. See, e.g., Chicago & S. 
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The court also recognized that its role in reviewing the quality or 
reliability of the information contained in the record was limited. 
This is because the Act restricts its review to an administrative record 
compiled solely by the Secretary of information “[n]ever subjected to 
adversary testing.”112 The Act has no provision allowing the putative 
terrorist organization an opportunity to introduce “counter-
evidence” into the record.113 The reliability of any information is 
difficult to judge without counter-evidence, counter-arguments, or 
counter-analyses with which to compare it. As a result, the court 
found that its only function “is to decide if the Secretary, on the face 
of things, had enough information before her to come to the 
conclusion that the organizations were foreign and engaged in 
terrorism.”114 
B. The National Council Decision 
The D.C. Circuit revisited the due process question again in 
National Council, holding that when a foreign organization has a 
property interest in the United States, due process requires the 
Secretary to provide the organization with notice and some type of 
hearing prior to designation under the Act.115 The petitioners in 
National Council were the National Council of Resistance of Iran 
(“NCRI”) and the PMOI. The PMOI was redesignated as a foreign 
terrorist organization by the Secretary of State on October 8, 1999, 
after the Secretary found that the PMOI continued to engage in 
terrorist activities.116 This redesignation of the PMOI extended its 
 
Air Lines, 333 U.S. at 111–12; Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454 (1939); United States 
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–21 (1936); Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 
246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918). The Court has recognized “the generally accepted view that 
foreign policy [is] the province and responsibility of the Executive.” Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 
280, 293–94 (1981). Matters related to foreign affairs and national security “are so exclusively 
entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry 
or interference,” Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952), and “are rarely proper 
subjects for judicial intervention.” Haig, 453 U.S. at 292. 
 112. People’s Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 25. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir 
2001), reh’g denied (August 27, 2001). 
 116. See Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,112 (Oct. 8, 
1999). In the two-year period following its 1997 designation, the PMOI allegedly claimed 
responsibility for the killing of two Iranian officials and three separate bombings of Iranian  
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1997 designation for two more years. The D.C. Circuit rejected the 
PMOI’s petition for review of the 1997 designation in the People’s 
Mojahedin case discussed above. The Secretary also designated the 
NCRI for the first time as a foreign terrorist organization on 
October 8, 1999, finding that NCRI was an “alias or alter ego” of 
the PMOI.117 The organizations argued, among other things,118 
“that by designating them without notice or hearing as a foreign 
terrorist organization . . . , the Secretary deprived them of liberty, or 
property, without due process of law, in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment.”119 
In examining whether the organizations had a constitutional 
presence in this country, the court determined that the “PMOI and 
NCRI have entered the territory of the United States and established 
substantial connections with this country.”120 While the court noted 
that “neither the record nor the classified information establishes a 
presence for the PMOI under its own name,” the same was not true 
as to the NCRI.121 The NCRI had “an overt presence within the 
National Press Building in Washington, D.C.” and claimed to have 
an interest in a $200 bank account.122 These connections were 
 
government facilities in Iran. See Brief for Respondents at 22, Nat’l Council (Nos. 99-1438, 
99-1439). 
 117. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 197. 
 118. The organizations made various constitutional and statutory arguments against the 
Secretary’s ability to make such “alias” designations; however, the court rejected these 
arguments because there was substantial support in the record indicating that the NCRI was an 
“alias” of the PMOI. Thus, while the Secretary did not specifically make the three required 
findings concerning the NCRI, the court reasoned that “[i]f the NCRI is the PMOI, and if the 
PMOI is a foreign terrorist organization, then the NCRI is a foreign terrorist organization 
also.” Id. at 200. 
 119. Id. The Secretary also argued that this line of reasoning was foreclosed by the 
court’s prior opinion in People’s Mojahedin, 182 F.3d 17. The court rejected this argument, 
reasoning that the mere fact that the PMOI did not establish its constitutional presence two 
years previously did not foreclose the possibility that it could “now have a presence in this 
country.” Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 201. 
 120. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 203. The court made a critical assumption here, the 
validity of which is beyond the scope of this Note. The court assumed that the standard 
required to be met before due process protection is extended to a foreign entity is the same 
standard as applied to an alien individual. This standard extends constitutional protection to 
aliens “when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed 
substantial connections with this country.” Id. at 202 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990)). 
 121. Id. at 201. 
 122. Id.; see also Brief for Respondents at 39, Nat’l Council (Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439). It 
is interesting to note that the court in People’s Mojahedin found that PMOI had “offices and 
ELL-FIN 9/30/2002 9:20 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
694 
sufficient to allow the NCRI to “lay claim to having come within the 
territory of the United States and developed substantial connections 
with this country.”123 The NCRI’s connections were also sufficient 
to allow the PMOI to claim a constitutional presence in this country. 
“The Secretary concluded in her designation,” the court observed, 
“that the NCRI and the PMOI are one. The NCRI is present in the 
United States. If A is B, and B is present, then A is present also.”124 
The court then found that the designation process and its 
consequences deprived the organizations of a constitutionally 
protected interest entitling them to due process of law.125 The court 
noted that “at least one of the [organizations] has an interest in a 
bank account in the United States.”126 This $200 bank account was 
in fact owned by the NCRI,127 but as the organizations “are one, if 
one [owns it], they both do.”128 The Supreme Court has made clear, 
the court continued, that “a foreign organization that acquires or 
holds property in this country may invoke the protections of the 
Constitution when that property is placed in jeopardy by 
government intervention.”129 As a result of the Secretary’s 
designation, all financial transactions involving the organizations’ 
bank account could be blocked.130 The court found that “for the 
present purposes, the colorable allegation [of the existence of a bank 
account] would seem enough to support their due process 
claims.”131 
The organizations also argued that the consequences of 
designation under the AEDPA deprived their members of certain 
 
members throughout . . . North America.” People’s Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 21. Some of those 
offices were located in the United States. See Brief of Petitioner People’s Mojahedin of Iran at 
10, Nat’l Council (Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439). Thus, the only difference between a finding of no 
constitutional presence in People’s Mojahedin and a finding of constitutional presence in 
National Council was a $200 bank account possessed by its alias, the NCRI. 
 123. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 201. 
 124. Id. at 202 
 125. See id. at 203. 
 126. See id. at 204. 
 127. See Brief for Respondents at 39, Nat’l Council (Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439); Brief for 
Petitioners at 19, Nat’l Council (Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439). 
 128. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 204. 
 129. Id. (citing Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 491–92 (1931)). 
 130. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(2)(C) (West 2001); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(2) (West 
2001). 
 131. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 204. 
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liberty interests. Members were deprived of their right to enter the 
United States, to travel outside of the United States, and to exercise 
their “First Amendment associational and expressive rights.”132 The 
court did not decide whether these alleged deprivations were enough 
to implicate due process “because the invasion of the Fifth 
Amendment protected property right . . . [wa]s sufficient to entitle 
[the organizations] to the due process of law.”133 
 
 132. Id. at 204–05. The organizations argued that designation under the AEDPA not 
only curtailed their right to contract, see Brief for Petitioners National Council of Resistance of 
Iran and National Council of Resistance of Iran, U.S. Representative Office at 21, Nat’l 
Council (Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439) (“stigmatizing governmental action curtailing the liberty to 
contract, whether for a beer, banking services, or anything else that can be bought in the free 
market, triggers procedural due process requirements”), but also curtailed their members’ 
rights to enter the United States, associate with the organizations, and provide material 
support to the organizations. See id. at 21; Brief of Petitioner People’s Mojahedin of Iran at 
15–16, Nat’l Council (Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439). The underlying premise of these arguments 
was that the interests identified above were so “fundamental” that they must be included 
within the definition of a “liberty” interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The court 
never reached the merits of these arguments because the organizations also argued that the 
designation deprived them of a property interest, see Brief of Petitioner People’s Mojahedin of 
Iran at 13, Nat’l Council (Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439), and the court determined that it “need 
not decide as an initial matter whether those consequences invade Fifth Amendment protected 
rights of liberty, because the invasion of the Fifth Amendment protected property right in the 
first consequence is sufficient to entitle [the organizations] to the due process of law.” Nat’l 
Council, 251 F.3d at 205. 
Although the court failed to reach the merits of these claims, the Ninth Circuit in 
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno rejected similar claims brought against the AEDPA under 
the First Amendment. See 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). The plaintiffs in that case alleged 
that the AEDPA violated the First Amendment by prohibiting the giving of material support 
to designated organizations and by restricting their right to associate with designated 
organizations. Id. at 1133–37. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims because the AEDPA 
was sufficiently tailored to accomplish its legitimate end of “preventing the United States from 
being used as a base for terrorist fundraising.” Id. at 1136. However, the court did determine 
that “two of the components included within the definition of material support, ‘training’ and 
‘personnel,’ were impermissibly vague,” and “enjoined the prosecution of any of the plaintiffs’ 
members for activities covered by these terms.” Id. at 1137. Congress amended the definition 
of material support subsequent to this decision; however, it did not eliminate the terms 
“training” or “personnel,” but instead added “expert advice or assistance” to the definition. 
See 8 U.S.C.A. § 2339A(b), amended by Uniting and Strengthening America by providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Interpret and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001, 
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 377. 
 133. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 205. In response to the argument that the designation 
deprives organization members of the right to enter the United States, the court noted that the 
Secretary argued “with some convincing force that aliens have no right of entry and that the 
organization has no standing to judicially assert rights which its members could not bring to 
court.” Id. at 204. In response to the First Amendment arguments, the government argued that 
“the limitation does not affect the ability of anyone to engage in advocacy of the goals of the 
organizations, but only from providing material support which might likely be employed in the 
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In addressing whether the Due Process Clause was violated in 
this case, the court examined “when” the constitutionally required 
process was due before examining “what” constitutionally required 
process was due.134 In other words, the court first determined 
whether the fundamental requirements of due process should be 
observed prior to or subsequent to a designation under the AEDPA. 
The Secretary argued that “no governmental interest is more 
compelling than the security of the nation.”135 This compelling 
interest would be frustrated “[i]f an organization were warned that it 
was being considered for designation as an alias of a foreign terrorist 
organization, [because] it would have an opportunity to remove or 
hide its assets . . . .”136 
The court apparently rejected the government’s argument, 
concluding that “the government has offered nothing that 
apparently weighs in favor of post-deprivational as opposed to pre-
deprivational compliance with due process requirements of the 
Constitution.”137 The court also noted that the Secretary has not 
“shown how affording the organization whatever due process they 
are due before their designation as foreign terrorist organizations 
and the resulting deprivation of right would interfere with the 
Secretary’s duty to carry out foreign policy.”138 As such, the court 
held that “the Secretary must afford the limited due process available 
to the putative foreign terrorist organization prior to the deprivation 
worked by designating that entity as such with its attendant 
consequences.”139 This holding, however, did “not foreclose the 
possibility of the Secretary, in an appropriate case, demonstrating the 
necessity of withholding all notice and all opportunity to present 
evidence until the designation is already made.”140 
 
pursuit of unlawful terrorist purposes as of First Amendment protected advocacy.” Id. at 205. 
 134. Id. at 205–06. 
 135. Id. at 207 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981)). 
 136. See Brief for Respondents at 48, Nat’l Council (Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439). 
 137. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 207. 
 138. Id. at 207–08. 
 139. Id. at 208 (emphasis added). While the court recognized an exception to the pre-
deprivation notice and hearing requirement if the Secretary could “make a showing of 
particularized need,” that showing is apparently not made when the Secretary compiles an 
administrative record supporting the conclusion that a foreign organization is using the United 
States as a base to fund terrorist activities, since notice to that organization will allow it to 
transfer any and all funds presently collected in the United States to another jurisdiction. 
 140. Id. 
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After determining the “when” of due process, the court then 
examined the “what” of due process. In other words, the court 
determined what procedural protections are constitutionally required 
in designating an organization under the AEDPA. The court 
recognized that the fundamental requirements of due process 
include notice of the action sought and a right to an effective 
hearing. “This,” the court held, “is what the Constitution requires of 
the Secretary in designating organizations as foreign terrorist 
organizations under the statute.”141 In order to satisfy the notice 
requirement, the court directed the Secretary to “provide notice of 
those unclassified items upon which he proposes to rely to the entity 
to be designated” once he “has reach[ed] a tentative determination 
that the designation is impending.”142 In order to meet the hearing 
requirement, the court directed the Secretary to “afford to the 
entities considered for imminent designation the opportunity to 
present, at least in written form, such evidence as those entities may 
be able to produce to rebut the administrative record or otherwise 
negate the proposition that they are foreign terrorist 
organizations.”143 
The court found that “even in those instances when post-
deprivation due process is sufficient, our review under § 1189(b) is 
not sufficient to supply the otherwise absent due process 
protection.”144 In other words, notice by publication in the Federal 
Register and the ability of putative terrorist organizations to petition 
the D.C. Circuit for review of designations alone will not satisfy due 
process in those cases where delayed notice is otherwise acceptable. 
This is because the court’s review is limited to an administrative 
record compiled solely by the Secretary “without notice or 
opportunity for any meaningful hearing.”145 
In conclusion, the court instructed the Secretary to afford due 
process rights to other organizations in the future. “While not within 
our current order,” the court stated, “we expect that the Secretary 
will afford due process rights to these and other similarly situated 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 209. 
 143. Id. 
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 145. Id. 
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entities in the course of future designations.”146 In fashioning a 
remedy, the court did not set aside the designations, but remanded 
the case to the Secretary “with instructions that the [organizations] 
be afforded the opportunity to file responses to the nonclassified 
evidence against them, to file evidence in support of their allegations 
that they are not terrorist organizations, and that they be afforded an 
opportunity to be meaningfully heard by the Secretary upon the 
relevant findings.”147 
V. EXAMINING THE NATIONAL COUNCIL DECISION 
THROUGH THE LENS OF DUE PROCESS 
The National Council decision will be examined in detail below 
using the Mathews balancing test. This section will first examine the 
court’s analysis as to the “when” of due process, and will argue that 
the court was incorrect in requiring notice and a hearing prior to 
designation under the AEDPA. The section will then examine the 
court’s analysis as to the “what” of due process, or the content of 
due process, and will argue that the court in National Council was 
correct in directing the Secretary to provide notice of a designation’s 
basis and an opportunity for a putative terrorist organization to 
introduce rebuttal evidence into the administrative record. 
A. The “When” of Due Process: The National Council Court  
Erred in Requiring Pre-Deprivation Process 
1. The private interest 
The first factor outlined in the Mathews balancing test requires 
consideration of “the private interest that will be affected by the 
official action.”148 The private interest in National Council was an 
interest in a $200 bank account.149 The Secretary argued that such an 
interest did not compare to the significant property interests found 
by the Supreme Court in prior cases in order to require notice and 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 149. See Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 204; Brief for Respondents at 39, Nat’l Council 
(Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439). 
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some type of hearing preceding deprivation.150 For example, the 
Court in James Daniel required pre-deprivation notice and a hearing 
prior to civil forfeiture of a home.151 The government essentially 
argued that the private interest in National Council did not carry 
much weight in the Mathews balancing test, especially when 
considering the other types of interests the Supreme Court has 
recognized as significant. 
The court in National Council apparently misunderstood the 
government’s reasoning, finding that “the decision would seem to 
weigh in favor of affording due process protection to the interest 
asserted by petitioners—it being a property interest as was the 
interest before the Supreme Court in James Daniel Good Real 
Property.”152 However, the issue being addressed in the 
government’s discussion of the James Daniel case was not whether 
the organizations were entitled to due process protection, but 
“when” that protection should be provided.153 It was the 
government’s opinion that cases like James Daniel demonstrated that 
minimal weight should be given to the NCRI’s interest in its bank 
account, thus rendering the constitutionality of post-designation 
process more likely. 
A review of James Daniel demonstrates that the Supreme Court 
did give special significance to the private interest in real property 
generally, and in a personal residence specifically. In James Daniel, 
the United States filed an in rem action “seeking to forfeit Good’s 
house and the 4-acre parcel on which it was situated.”154 The 
government “sought forfeiture under 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(7), on 
the ground that the property had been used to commit or facilitate 
the commission of a federal drug offense.”155 In an ex parte hearing, 
a United States Magistrate Judge authorized seizure of Good’s 
property after finding that “the Government had established 
probable cause to believe Good’s property was subject to 
 
 150. See Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 206. 
 151. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 47 (1993) 
(emphasis added). 
 152. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 206. 
 153. See Brief for Respondents at 46–47, Nat’l Council (Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439). 
 154. James Daniel, 510 U.S. at 497. 
 155. Id. Four and a half years previously, Hawaii police found drugs and drug 
paraphernalia in Good’s home when executing a search warrant. Good pled guilty to 
“promoting a harmful drug in the second degree, in violation of Hawaii law.” Id. 
ELL-FIN 9/30/2002 9:20 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
700 
forfeiture.”156 A few days later, the government seized the property 
without a prior hearing or notice to Good.157 Good challenged the 
seizure on due process grounds.158 
After discussing the above facts, the Supreme Court restated “the 
general rule that individuals must receive notice and an opportunity 
to be heard before the Government deprives them of property.”159 
The government argued that “seizure of real property under the 
drug forfeiture laws justifies an exception to the usual due process 
requirement of preseizure notice and hearing.”160 The Court rejected 
this argument and held that “[u]nless exigent circumstances are 
present, the Due Process Clause requires the Government to afford 
notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before seizing real 
property subject to civil forfeiture.”161 In explaining its holding, the 
Court noted that the “constitutional limitations we enforce in this 
case apply to real property in general.”162 The private interest in real 
property, particularly a residence, “is a private interest of historic and 
continuing importance.”163 A government seizure of real property 
deprives the owner “of valuable rights of ownership, including the 
right to sale, the right of occupancy, the right to unrestricted use and 
enjoyment, and the right to receive rents.”164 When dealing with the 
seizure of real property, the private interests at stake “weigh heavily 
in the Mathews balance.”165 
While the NCRI’s interest in its $200 bank account should be 
accorded some weight, it is not one of those interests, like the 
interest in real property discussed above, that “weigh[s] heavily in 
the Mathews balance.”166 Of course, it will not always be the case that 
the amount of money blocked under the designation provisions of 
the AEDPA will be so minimal. In all probability, the weight a court 
will give to an organization’s private interest in money will increase 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. See id. at 498. 
 158. See id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 498–99. 
 161. Id. at 505 (emphasis added). 
 162. Id. (emphasis added). 
 163. Id. at 501. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
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as the amount of money in controversy increases. However, when 
compared to the compelling interest of the government in 
preventing a putative terrorist organization from transferring its 
assets to another jurisdiction before a designation takes effect, an 
organization’s interest in a financial account does not seem so 
significant. 
2. The risk of erroneous deprivation 
The second factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation, basically 
entails an evaluation of the potential value of a hearing in decreasing 
the risk of error.167 The Secretary argued that “the risk of erroneous 
deprivation here is minimized by the statutory standards and 
procedures specified by the Antiterrorism Act.”168 First, the Secretary 
must “compile an administrative record on which a designation 
decision must be based.”169 Second, the Secretary must “consult with 
the Attorney General and the Secretary of Treasury before 
designating a foreign terrorist organization.”170 Third, the Secretary 
must also “notify congressional leaders seven days before designating 
such an organization.”171 The congressional notification must be in 
writing and must include information “of the intent to designate a 
foreign organization under [the statute], together with the 
[required] findings . . . with respect to that organization, and the 
factual basis therefor.”172 In addition, although not noted by the 
government or the court, any designation under the statute “shall 
cease to have effect upon an Act of Congress disapproving such 
designation,”173 or upon revocation by the Secretary of State due to 
changed circumstances.174 The court summarily rejected the 
Secretary’s arguments because neither the involvement of various 
officials in the executive branch, nor notice to legislative leaders in 
the legislative branch can substitute for a pre-deprivation hearing.175 
 
 167. See id. 
 168. Brief for Respondents at 47, Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 
251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439). 
 169. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(1) (West 2001). 
 170. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d 192, 206; see also 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(c)(4). 
 171. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 206–07; see also 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(2)(A). 
 172. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(i). 
 173. Id. § 1189(a)(2)(B)(ii). 
 174. See id. § 1189(a)(6). 
 175. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 207. 
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While the court was correct that mere consultation with various 
legislative and executive officials cannot replace a pre-deprivation 
hearing, such consultation arguably reduces, at least modestly, the 
risk of an erroneous decision. In addition, the straightforward nature 
of the three factual findings that the Secretary must make under the 
Act also reduces the risk of error. The first finding is relatively 
simple, thus making the risk of error relatively small—the 
organization must be foreign. The second finding involves the 
question of whether the organization engages in terrorist activities. It 
is often very clear whether or not an organization engages in 
terrorism due to the tendency of such organizations to claim 
responsibility for terrorist activities committed by them. However, 
there may be cases where the issue is not so clear. In those cases, the 
risk that terrorism poses to the national security of the United States 
and to the physical safety of Americans weighs in favor of deferring 
to an initial judgment by the executive branch and allowing the 
putative terrorist organization to contest the designation after its 
financial support is extinguished. The third and final finding involves 
a judgment that is entrusted solely to the executive branch and is not 
subject to judicial review—determining whether the terrorist 
organization threatens the national security interests of the United 
States. Since this finding requires consideration of the government’s 
interests, and no one is in a better position to judge the 
government’s interests than the government itself, the risk of error in 
assessing this factor appears small. 
It is also true, however, that if an organization is allowed to 
present evidence rebutting the contention that it engages in terrorist 
activities prior to a designation, the judgment as to whether the 
organization’s activities threaten U.S. interests may be different. 
Indeed, the National Council court correctly concluded that these 
procedures could not achieve the potential risk reduction that may 
be realized by a pre-designation hearing.176 A pre-designation 
hearing would in theory reduce the risk of error due to the ability of 
an organization considered for imminent designation to introduce 
rebuttal evidence to the Secretary before a designation takes effect. 
On the other hand, it does not seem likely in practice that any 
information introduced by an organization to the Secretary would be 
sufficient to change the Secretary’s mind or affect the adequacy of 
 
 176. Id. 
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the record. However, the theoretical possibility of a reduction in the 
risk of erroneous deprivation that may be realized with the provision 
of a hearing prior to designation under the AEDPA cannot be 
dismissed on mere assumptions as to how a hearing will actually 
affect the decision-making process.177 It is sufficient for the purposes 
of this Note to presume that a pre-designation hearing will reduce 
the risk of erroneous deprivations at least somewhat. Even in making 
this assumption, however, the potential benefits realized from a pre-
deprivation hearing are decidedly outweighed by the government’s 
interest in taking immediate action to protect itself and its people 
from the activities of terrorist organizations. It seems reasonable to 
defer to the executive branch the initial determination as to whether 
an organization should be designated, especially when that 
organization has the ability to contest the executive’s determination 
following its imposition. 
3. The government’s interest 
The third factor in the Mathews balancing test entails an 
examination of “the Government’s interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional 
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”178 The Secretary 
argued that the government’s interest in prohibiting terrorism was 
compelling.179 This compelling interest would be frustrated, the 
government alleged, “[i]f an organization were warned that it was 
being considered for designation as an alias of a foreign terrorist 
organization, [because] it would have an opportunity to remove or 
hide its assets.”180 In similar situations, “the Supreme Court has 
recognized, on many occasions, that where [the Government] must 
act quickly, or where it would be impractical to provide pre-
deprivation process, post-deprivation process satisfies the 
requirements of Due Process Clause.”181 
Despite this argument, the court concluded that “the 
government has offered nothing that apparently weighs in favor of a 
post-deprivational as opposed to pre-deprivational compliance with 
 
 177. Id. at 209. 
 178. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 179. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 207 (internal quotations omitted). 
 180. See Brief for Respondents at 48, Nat’l Council (Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439). 
 181. Id. at 46 (quoting Gilbert v. Homar, 117 S. Ct. 1807, 1812 (1997)). 
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due process requirements of the Constitution.”182 The court also 
noted that the Secretary has not “shown how affording the 
organizations whatever due process they are due before their 
designation as foreign terrorist organizations and the resulting 
deprivation of right would interfere with the Secretary’s duty to carry 
out foreign policy.”183 As such, the court held that “the Secretary 
must afford the limited due process available to the putative foreign 
terrorist organization prior to the deprivation worked by designating 
that entity as such with its attendant consequences.”184 
In all fairness to the court, the government’s brief “made little 
effort to tie the factors to the question of ‘when’ as opposed to 
‘what’ due process is to be afforded.”185 However, the government 
did argue that pre-designation process would frustrate the purposes 
of the designation, and that argument was found with relative ease in 
its discussion of the due process question.186 It is difficult to 
understand why the court did not address this argument in its 
opinion. It was apparent that the NCRI maintained an interest in a 
United States bank account. The NCRI was challenging its first 
designation under the AEDPA, and thus the bank account was not 
frozen prior to the designation, as would be the case in the 
redesignation of an organization with financial assets in the United 
States. If the NCRI had received notice of the impending 
designation, it would have had the opportunity to transfer what little 
assets it did have to a jurisdiction outside of the United States. 
Despite these considerations, the court found that “[i]t is not 
immediately apparent how the foreign policy goals of the 
government in general and the Secretary in particular would be 
inherently impaired by [prior] notice.”187 
The court was quick to point out that its holding did “not 
foreclose the possibility of the Secretary [demonstrating], in an 
appropriate case, . . . the necessity of withholding all notice and all 
opportunity to present evidence until the designation is already 
 
 182. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 207. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 208 (emphasis added). 
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made.”188 It also suggested that upon a showing of “particularized 
need,” the Secretary may be able to provide putative terrorist 
organizations with notice and some type of hearing following a 
designation.189 But if the interest of the government in prohibiting 
terrorism, combined with the ease in which a putative terrorist 
organization like the NCRI can transfer funds outside the 
jurisdiction of the United States, does not justify postponing notice 
until after designation, it is difficult to imagine what additional 
showing the government must make in order to so qualify under the 
court’s standard. 
The court also failed to address Supreme Court case law allowing 
post-deprivation process when the government interest meets certain 
criteria. 190 Even in James Daniel, where the Court held that pre-
deprivation notice and hearing must be afforded before the seizure 
of real property, the Court recognized that the government may be 
justified in postponing notice and hearing when seizing property 
“that could be removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed, or 
concealed, if advance warning of confiscation were given.”191 The 
issue of post-deprivation process was directly addressed by the Court 
in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.192 The plaintiff in that 
case leased his yacht to two Puerto Rican residents.193 A little over a 
year later, Puerto Rican authorities found marihuana on board the 
yacht and seized the yacht pursuant to a statute which provided that 
“vessels used to transport, or to facilitate the transportation of, 
controlled substances, including marihuana, are subject to seizure 
and forfeiture to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.”194 The yacht 
“was seized without prior notice to [the lessor] or either lessee and 
without prior adversary hearing.”195 Notice was given to the lessees 
of the seizure, but when the seizure was not challenged within 
 
 188. Id. at 209. 
 189. Id. at 208–09. 
 190. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); N. 
Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908); Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 
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Comm’r, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547 (1921). 
 191. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 52 (1993) (quoting 
Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 679). 
 192. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 663. 
 193. See id. at 665. 
 194. Id. at 665–67. 
 195. Id. at 667. 
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fifteen days of the notice, the yacht was forfeited to the Puerto Rican 
government.196 The lessor learned of the seizure and forfeiture of the 
yacht some days later while “attempting to repossess the yacht from 
the lessees, because of their apparent failure to pay rent.”197 The 
lessor filed suit, seeking a declaration that the seizure and forfeiture 
laws violated due process.198 
The Supreme Court denied the lessor’s due process claim 
because “seizure for purposes of forfeiture is one of those 
extraordinary situations that justif[ies] postponing notice and 
opportunity for a hearing.”199 The Court recognized that “in limited 
circumstances, immediate seizure of a property interest, without an 
opportunity for prior hearing, is constitutionally permissible.”200 
Such circumstances occur when three factors are present: (1) “the 
seizure has been directly necessary to secure an important 
governmental or general public interest”; (2) “there has been a 
special need for very prompt action”; and (3) “the State has kept 
strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person 
initiating the seizure has been a government official responsible for 
determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it 
was necessary and justified in the particular instance.” 201 
The Court determined that the “considerations that justif[y] 
postponement of notice and hearing . . . are present here.”202 First, 
the seizure of the yacht serves an important government purpose 
because it “permits Puerto Rico to assert in rem jurisdiction over the 
property in order to conduct forfeiture proceedings, thereby 
fostering the public interest in preventing continued illicit use of the 
property and in enforcing criminal sanctions.”203 In addition, 
“preseizure notice and hearing might frustrate the interests served by 
the statutes, since the property seized—as here, a yacht—will often 
be of a sort that could be removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed, 
or concealed, if advance warning of confiscation were given.”204 
 
 196. See id. at 667–68. 
 197. Id. at 668. 
 198. See id. at 664. 
 199. Id. at 677 (internal quotations omitted). 
 200. Id. at 678. 
 201. Id. (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972)). 
 202. Id. at 679. 
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ELL-FIN 9/30/2002 9:20 AM 
675] Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
 707 
Finally, “seizure is not initiated by self-interested private parties; 
rather, Commonwealth officials determine whether seizure is 
appropriate under the provisions of the Puerto Rican statutes.”205 
Under these circumstances, the Court held that “this case presents 
an ‘extraordinary’ situation in which postponement of notice and 
hearing until after seizure did not deny due process.”206 
Application of the Calero-Toledo factors to the AEDPA and the 
facts of National Council demonstrates that due process does not 
require pre-designation process to be given to putative terrorist 
organizations that may have financial assets within the jurisdiction of 
the United States. First, designation under the Act and its resulting 
consequences serve important governmental interests. Congress has 
recognized that “terrorism is a serious and deadly problem that 
threatens the vital interests of the United States,”207 that recent 
events have demonstrated the threat that terrorism poses to the 
physical well-being of United States residents and to domestic and 
international commerce,208 and that some organizations finance these 
terrorist activities by “rais[ing] significant funds within the United 
States, or us[ing] the United States as a conduit for the receipt of 
funds raised in other nations.”209 The United States’ attempt to 
designate foreign organizations that participate in terrorism in order 
to starve them of the financial capital needed to conduct terrorist 
activities can be fairly described as compelling. Even the National 
Council court itself recognized that “no governmental interest is 
more compelling than the security of the nation.”210 
The interest in prohibiting terrorism and the financial 
consequences resulting from designation under the Act represent a 
rare circumstance where there is “a special need for very prompt 
action.”211 Even more than the yacht in Calero-Toledo, money found 
in a bank account is easily “removed to another jurisdiction, 
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destroyed, or concealed, if advance warning of confiscation were 
given.”212 Affording an organization notice and a hearing prior to 
designation would frustrate the intent underlying the designation 
provisions of the AEDPA, which intent was to curb terrorist activity 
and terrorist funding, because a putative foreign terrorist 
organization once notified would presumably hide or transfer its 
assets. 
While it may seem that the special need for prompt action is not 
justified when dealing with a paltry sum of money like the $200 in 
the National Council case, Congress has indicated that “foreign 
organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their 
criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization 
facilitates that conduct.”213 In addition, there was the possibility that 
the NCRI had bank accounts within the United States of which the 
Secretary was not aware. This possibility justified prompt action in 
designating the NCRI first, putting American financial institutions 
on notice of the designation, and then determining what assets of 
the NCRI, if any, were subject to blockage under the Act. The 
AEDPA contemplates such a procedure by requiring “any financial 
institution that becomes aware that it has possession of, or control 
over, any funds in which a terrorist organization, or its agent, has an 
interest, . . . [to] report to the Secretary the existence of such 
funds . . . .”214 
The third and final factor discussed in the Calero-Toledo case was 
whether the person initiating the deprivation was “a government 
official responsible for determining, under the standards of a 
narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and justified in the 
particular instance.” 215 It is clear that designation under the AEDPA 
satisfies this factor. The Secretary of State, a government official, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Treasury and the Attorney 
General, and after notifying several congressional leaders, determines 
whether designation is appropriate under the AEDPA.216 The Act 
requires the Secretary to make three required findings before 
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designating an organization as a foreign terrorist organization.217 
The Act also requires the Secretary to conclude whether the putative 
terrorist organization threatens the national security of the United 
States, thus necessitating blockage of the organization’s financial 
assets in order to protect the United States and its people. 
In sum, the three essential considerations that informed the 
Calero-Toledo Court’s ruling to allow post-deprivation process are 
present here. First, immediate blocking of terrorist funds is necessary 
in order to establish the United States’ jurisdiction over the 
property.218 Second, the money may disappear if the government 
gives advance warning of its intent to block the funds.219 Third, the 
designation is made by the Secretary of State under the provisions of 
the AEDPA. Consideration of these factors indicates that the 
National Council court did not give proper weight to the 
government’s interest, and when balanced against the NCRI’s 
interest in a bank account and the risk of error, the government’s 
interest is sufficiently compelling so as to justify post-designation 
process in this case.220 The designation of foreign terrorist 
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National Council, there may be situations in which pre-designation process is required. For 
example, if an entity is being redesignated under the Act, then presumably all of its assets are 
already frozen, and it does not have the ability to hide or transfer its assets once notified by the 
Secretary of its imminent redesignation. Indeed, the National Council court recognized that 
“[i]t is particularly difficult to discern how . . . [prior] notice could interfere with the 
Secretary’s legitimate goals were it presented to an entity such as the PMOI concerning its 
redesignation.” Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 208 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001). In this type of situation, the compelling governmental interest in delaying notice 
and a hearing until after designation is simply not present, and pre-designation process will 
normally be required, unless the organization has no constitutional presence in the United 
States. 
It is not always the case, however, that redesignation will require the Secretary to afford 
putative terrorist organizations with pre-designation process. The facts of National Council 
demonstrate this well. At the outset, it is important to recognize that if the NCRI was not 
designated as an alias of the PMOI, the PMOI would not have been able to establish a 
constitutional presence in the United States. Without this presence, the PMOI could not even 
assert a due process claim, let alone claim entitlement to pre-designation process. While it is true 
that providing such an entity with pre-deprivation process would not interfere with the Secretary’s 
foreign policy goals, the Secretary is simply not constitutionally required to provide such an entity 
with due process. The PMOI was saved from this fate by the designation of the NCRI as its alias 
and the NCRI’s possession of a bank account. But since the NCRI’s possession of a bank 
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organizations with financial assets in the United States “present[s] an 
extraordinary situation in which postponement of notice and hearing 
until after seizure d[oes] not deny due process.”221 
B. The “What” of Due Process: The National Council Court  
Did Not Err in Requiring Additional Procedural Protection 
In addition to the question of whether post-designation process 
satisfies the Constitution, there remains the issue of whether the 
procedural protections outlined in the AEDPA, given before or after 
a designation, actually satisfy due process. This issue concerns the 
“what” of due process. While consideration of the Mathews factors 
indicates that process may be constitutionally provided after a 
designation is made, consideration of these same factors 
demonstrates that the procedural protections of the Act do not meet 
the requirements of the Due Process Clause. The National Council 
court was correct in requiring the Secretary to give notice to putative 
terrorist organizations of the basis of designations and in requiring 
the Secretary to allow such organizations the opportunity to 
introduce rebuttal evidence into the record.222 
 
account implicates the government’s interest in preventing the transfer of assets prior to 
designation, and since the NCRI and the PMOI are one, the Due Process Clause was not 
violated by postponing process for both organizations until after the designation. 
 221. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 679–80. President Bush recently confirmed this 
conclusion in Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001): 
For those persons listed in the Annex to this order or determined to be subject to 
this order who might have a constitutional presence in the United States, I find that 
because of the ability to transfer funds or assets instantaneously, prior notice to such 
persons of measures to be taken pursuant to this order would render these measures 
ineffectual. I therefore determine that for these measures to be effective in 
addressing the national emergency declared in this order, there need be no prior 
notice of a listing or determination made pursuant to this order. 
 222. Instead of finding the underlying statute unconstitutional, the National Council 
court simply required the Secretary of State to provide putative terrorist organizations with 
certain constitutionally required procedures. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 209. Calling this 
portion of the National Council decision “impermissible judicial legislation,” a federal district 
court recently refused to construe any procedures into § 1189. United States v. Rahmani, 209 
F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1057 (C.D. Cal 2002). As a result, the court held the statute to be facially 
unconstitutional for failing to provide putative terrorist organizations with notice and an 
opportunity to introduce rebuttal evidence into the record. Id. at 1058. Although it is 
tempting to address the decision’s criticism of National Council, such a discussion is beyond 
the scope of this Note. The decision’s value as precedent is also negligible, since challenges to 
designations under the AEDPA must be brought in the D.C. Circuit. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 
1189(b)(1); Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000). But see 
Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1053. 
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1. Terrorist organizations must be allowed to introduce rebuttal 
evidence into the record 
Organizations may challenge designations made under the 
AEDPA in the D.C. Circuit within thirty days after publication of 
the designations in the Federal Register.223 The court’s review of a 
designation must be “based solely upon the administrative 
record.”224 The Secretary may also present classified information 
relied upon in making a designation for ex parte and in camera 
review.225 The court in National Council held that this post-
designation hearing alone did not satisfy the due process hearing 
requirement, but that the Secretary must also afford putative terrorist 
organizations with “the opportunity to present, at least in written 
form, such evidence as . . . [they] may be able to produce to rebut 
the administrative record or otherwise negate the proposition that 
they are foreign terrorist organizations.”226 Application of the 
Mathews factors to the AEDPA and the facts presented in National 
Council demonstrates that the court’s holding in this respect was 
correct. 
The constitutionally cognizable private interest that will probably 
most often be implicated by designation under the AEDPA is an 
organization’s interest in some financial asset possessed or controlled 
by a United States financial institution.227 The NCRI in National 
Council asserted an interest in a United States bank account.228 The 
court found that this interest was sufficient to entitle the NCRI to 
due process protection.229 One of “the fundamental requirement[s] 
of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner.”230 This hearing requirement normally 
must include the opportunity for an opposing party to introduce 
 
 223. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(b)(1) (West 2001). 
 224. Id. § 1189(b)(2). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 209. The court stated that “even in those instances when 
post-deprivation process is sufficient, our review under § 1189(b) is not sufficient to supply the 
otherwise absent due process protection.” Id. 
 227. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(C). 
 228. Id. at 201; see also Brief for Respondents at 39, Nat’l Council (Nos. 99-1438, 99-
1439). 
 229. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 203. 
 230. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 
380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). 
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rebuttal evidence into the record.231 An organization does not have 
this opportunity under the statutory provisions of the AEDPA. In 
order to dispense with this requirement, if it is possible at all, the risk 
of erroneous deprivation must be low and the government interest 
must be high. Such a situation does not exist here. The importance 
of the government’s interest may justify delaying a hearing until after 
a designation, but it certainly does not justify eliminating a 
meaningful hearing entirely. 
The prevailing assumption is that providing an opposing party 
with an opportunity to present rebuttal evidence into the record will 
reduce the risk of an erroneous decision.232 In considering the nature 
of the record upon which the Secretary bases her determination, this 
assumption seems well placed when dealing with designations under 
the AEDPA. The D.C. Circuit noted in reviewing past designations 
that the administrative “record consists entirely of hearsay, none of 
it . . . ever subjected to adversary testing, and . . . no opportunity for 
counter-evidence by the organizations affected.”233 Without counter-
evidence in the record, the court is unable to test the reliability or 
accuracy of the information upon which the Secretary relied in 
making a designation. “As we see it,” the court observed, “our only 
function is to decide if the Secretary, on the face of things, had 
enough information before her to come to the conclusion that the 
organizations were foreign and engaged in terrorism.”234 That 
determination “might be mistaken, but that depends on the quality 
of the information in the reports she received—something we have 
no way of judging.”235 In light of the compelling nature of the 
government’s interest in protecting this nation from terrorism, it 
seems reasonable to delay the opportunity to introduce rebuttal 
evidence until after a designation is made. However, once a 
particular designation is made and the financial assets of the targeted 
organization are frozen, the objections to allowing the organization 
to introduce rebuttal evidence into the record are eliminated, and 
the risk of error present in a decision based on a record compiled 
 
 231. See, e.g., Wolf v. McDonnel, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974) (“Ordinarily, the right to 
present evidence is basic to a fair hearing.”). 
 232. See, e.g., Lister v. Hoover, 706 F.2d 796, 804 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 233. People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 25 (D.C. Cir. 
1999). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
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solely by the Secretary weighs in favor of providing this procedural 
protection. 
2. Terrorist organizations must be given notice of the basis of 
designation 
The Secretary must notify Congress one week prior to making a 
designation.236 Once Congress is notified of an impending 
designation, all financial assets of the putative foreign terrorist 
organization found within the possession or control of United States 
financial institutions may be blocked. 237 Seven days after notifying 
Congress, the Secretary must publish the designation in the Federal 
Register.238 The court in National Council found the notice 
provided to putative terrorist organizations generally, and the NCRI 
and the PMOI specifically, constitutionally insufficient.239 In order to 
meet the demands of due process, the court held that the Secretary 
must provide a putative terrorist organization with notice of the 
designation, the administrative record, and the unclassified items 
upon which she relied or proposes to rely in making the 
designation.240 Application of the Mathews factors to the AEDPA and 
the facts in National Council will demonstrate that the court’s 
conclusion as to notice was correct. 
As mentioned above, a putative terrorist organization’s claim to 
constitutional protection will probably most often arise from the 
deprivation of a financial asset controlled or possessed by a United 
States financial institution.241 The NCRI had an interest in a $200 
bank account.242 There is little question that this interest entitles the 
NCRI and other similarly situated organizations to the protection of 
the Due Process Clause.243 One of the fundamental protections 
provided by due process is notice of the action sought and its 
 
 236. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(i) (West 2001). 
 237. See id. § 1189(a)(2)(C); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(2) (West 2001). 
 238. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
 239. Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 209 (D.C. Cir. 
2001). 
 240. Id. at 209. 
 241. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(2)(C). 
 242. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 201; see also Brief for Respondents at 39, Nat’l Council 
(Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439). 
 243. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 203. 
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basis.244 While the AEDPA does give a putative terrorist organization 
notice of a designation by publication in the Federal Register, it does 
not give an organization notice of the designation’s basis. Without 
this notice, it is extremely difficult for an organization to utilize the 
availability of a hearing because of its inability to determine the 
underlying factors upon which the Secretary relied in making a 
designation. Imposing such a difficulty on a putative terrorist 
organization can be justified, if at all, by circumstances indicating 
that the risk of erroneous deprivation is minimal and the government 
interest is compelling. Designation under the AEDPA does not 
present such a situation. 
When the Secretary publishes notice of designations in the 
Federal Register, she merely lists the name of each foreign terrorist 
organization and the names of its aliases. Nowhere does the 
document state the factual basis for designating each organization. 
In all probability, an organization will not learn of the information 
upon which the Secretary relied in making the designation unless 
and until it challenges the Secretary’s decision in the D.C. Circuit. At 
that time, the Secretary will be forced to publicly file the unclassified 
version of the administrative record in order to support her 
decision.245 However, receiving notice so late in the game necessarily 
prevents the organization from presenting rebuttal evidence in the 
administrative record in an attempt to change the Secretary’s mind. 
This in turn will likely increase the risk of a mistaken deprivation, 
especially considering that the record upon which judicial review is 
based may be composed entirely of hearsay evidence.246 While the 
importance of the government’s interest in protecting the American 
people from terrorism weighs in favor of delaying notice until after a 
designation is made, it cannot support the total denial of proper 
notice to a putative terrorist organization when the reasons for 
delaying notice no longer exist. 
It is clear that pre-designation notice would allow a putative 
terrorist organization to hide or transfer its assets outside of the 
jurisdiction of the United States. This would undermine the 
 
 244. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 39 (1982) (“To satisfy due process, 
notice must clarify what the charges are in a manner adequate to apprise the individual of the 
basis for the government’s proposed action.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 245. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 209. 
 246. People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 25 (D.C. Cir. 
1999). 
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government’s ability to stifle funding to terrorist organizations. 
However, it is not clear how this same interest applies to “what” type 
of notice a terrorist organization should be given. In other words, 
the question of “when” notice should be given bears little 
relationship in this case to what the content of that notice should be 
when actually given. The government may have an interest in 
withholding some information upon which the Secretary relied in 
making a designation when that information is confidential. Indeed, 
the National Council court itself recognized this governmental 
interest by allowing the government to withhold the presentation of 
such information to the organization in question.247 The government 
may instead present this confidential information in camera and ex 
parte to the court in accordance with the provisions of the 
AEDPA.248 However, this fails to justify the government in not 
informing putative terrorist organizations of the non-classified 
information upon which the Secretary relied in making designations, 
especially when considering the risk of erroneous deprivation and the 
important private interest involved. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
President Bush has indicated that “a major thrust of our war on 
terrorism . . . [is to] launch[] a strike on the financial foundation of 
the global terror network.”249 The designation provisions of the 
AEDPA are a major weapon in the war that can and should be used 
to accomplish the objective of curbing the ability of terrorist 
organizations to fund terrorist activity. Under the Act, the Secretary 
of State can block all financial transactions involving the assets of a 
foreign terrorist organization. In addition, the Secretary can prohibit 
anyone from providing material support to a foreign terrorist 
organization. Prior notice of an impending designation would render 
the consequences of the designation ineffective due to the ability of 
an organization to quickly transfer its assets to another jurisdiction. 
A careful balancing of the private interest, the risk of error, and the 
government interest found in the National Council case indicates 
 
 247. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 208–09. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Remarks on the United States Financial Sanctions Against Foreign Terrorists and 
Their Supporters and an Exchange with Reporters, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1364, 
1364 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
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that the court erroneously required pre-designation process. 
Designation of a foreign terrorist organization with financial assets in 
the United States is one of those “extraordinary situation[s] in which 
postponement of notice and hearing until after seizure d[oes] not 
deny due process.”250 
If the decision in National Council is upheld, the purpose of the 
designation procedure under the AEDPA will be completely 
undermined, and the statute will no longer be effective in blocking 
the assets of foreign terrorist organizations within the United States. 
This result would be unfortunate given the increasing threat of 
terrorism to the United States and its people. As President Bush 
indicated following the terrorist attacks of September 11, the United 
States intends to “direct every resource at . . . [its] command, every 
means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of 
law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary 
weapon of war, to the disruption and to the defeat of the global 
terror network.”251 The designation provisions of the AEDPA are 
one such resource that can and should be used to curb the threat of 
terrorism. The D.C. Circuit should reevaluate its decision in 
National Council and hold that post-designation process does not 
violate the Due Process Clause when designating a putative terrorist 
organization with financial assets in the United States. 
Joshua A. Ellis 
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